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1. Introduction
This paper is a dialogue between Huw Price and Travis Norsen, loosely inspired by
a letter that Price received from John Bell in 1988. The main topic of discussion is Bell’s
views about retrocausal approaches to quantum theory and their relevance to contempo-
rary issues.
2. Price (I)
As far as I can recall, I first heard about Bell’s Theorem at a workshop at Wolfson
College, Oxford, in the Spring of 1977 (I was in Oxford that year as an MSc student in
Mathematics). I remember little of the talk, except that the speaker noted in passing that
Bell’s argument required the assumption that the properties of the particles concerned
did not depend on the future measurement settings. At any rate, that is what I took him
to be saying. I certainly do not recall the exact words, and we will see in a moment that
there is another possibility for what he might have meant—but that was the sense of the
assumption I took away.
I remember even this much because I was puzzled at the time that this assumption
seemed to be regarded as uncontroversial. I had read some philosophy of time by that
point—enough to be convinced that past and future are equally real, and to be familiar
with the idea that time-asymmetry in the physical world is a statistical matter. Yet here
was a time-asymmetric assumption about what can affect what—on the face of it, not a
statistical matter— playing a crucial role in Bell’s argument. Everyone seemed to agree that
the argument led to a highly counterintuitive conclusion. But the option of avoiding the
conclusion by rejecting the assumption did not seem to be on the table.
More than 40 years later, I am still puzzled. I have returned to the issue at intervals
over those years, always looking for a good reason for closing what seemed to me an
open door—a door, among other things, to a potential resolution of the tension between
quantum theory and special relativity. To me, nature seemed to be offering us a huge hint,
a hint revealed in Bell’s work, that our intuitions about what can depend on what are
unreliable in the quantum world. Yet few of my growing circle of friends and colleagues
who knew about these issues—who knew a great deal more than I did, in most cases—ever
seemed able to hear the hint. I often wondered what I was missing.
After my year in Mathematics at Oxford, I shifted to Philosophy in Cambridge. There,
as some sort of sideline to my main thesis project on probability, I spent some time on
the puzzle I had brought with me from Oxford. In [1], a piece written in November 1978,
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I discuss what is in effect the following assumption, central to what is now called the
ontological models framework [2]:
In the ontological models framework, it is assumed that the probability measure
representing a quantum state is independent of the choice of future measurement
setting. (Leifer [3] (140))
My 1978 piece argues that this kind of assumption is ‘very difficult to justify on
metaphysical grounds’, and notes that abandoning it has a very interesting potential payoff,
given its crucial role in the no-go theorems of Bell and of Kochen & Specker. However,
as the present ubiquity of the ontological models framework demonstrates, this has not
become a common concern. Now, as in the 1970s, the assumption in question usually
passes without comment—it is simply part of the model.
A couple of years later again, now a postdoc at ANU, Canberra, I worked on this little
obsession some more. I focussed on the work of the Oxford philosopher Michael Dummett
(who had been at the Wolfson workshop in 1977, I believe). Dummett had two well-known
papers defending the coherence of retrocausality [4,5], and in a piece published in Synthese
in 1984 [6] I offered some refinements to Dummett’s arguments, and noted their potential
application in the quantum case.
Back at ANU later in 1980s, I wrote the early drafts of a piece that eventually appeared
in Mind in 1994 [7]. I think it was a draft of this piece, together with my Synthese piece [6]
from 1984, that I sent to John Bell in 1988. His brief reply appears as Figure 1. On the idea
of retrocausality, he says this:
I have not myself been able to make any sense of the notion of backward causation.
When I try to think of it I lapse quickly into fatalism.
Figure 1. The letter from Bell.
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For ‘what little I can say’, Bell then refers to a published discussion [8] with Shimony,
Clauser, and Horne.
Bell’s reference to fatalism in this letter certainly chimed with some of his published
remarks, to the effect that to abandon the assumption in question, we would have to
abandon the assumption that we are free to choose the measurement settings. This is from
the piece referred to in his letter, for example:
It has been assumed that the settings of instruments are in some sense free
variables—say at the whim of the experimenters—or in any case not determined
in the overlap of the backward lightcones. Indeed without such freedom I would
not know how to formulate any idea of local causality, even the modest human
one [8].
In the light of such remarks, the option of abandoning this assumption became known
as the free will or freedom of choice loophole in Bell’s Theorem.
As I will explain, Bell’s letter did not do much to remove my sense of puzzlement. But
it did help me to see that there are two very different models for what would be involved
in abandoning the crucial assumption in Bell’s argument—and that it was at least unclear
whether Bell himself had properly distinguished them. Moreover, the model discussed
in [8] was not the one that had interested me in the first place.
Accordingly, when I next wrote about these topics [9,10], I tried to distinguish the
two models. Briefly, the difference is this. Both models involve correlations between
measurement settings and properties of an incoming particle. In other words, both reject
the assumption often referred to as Statistical Independence. But they propose to explain this
correlation in very different ways.
It is a familiar idea that we need to distinguish correlation from causation, and that
the same pattern on correlations may be compatible with more than one causal explanation.
In susceptible folk, for example, eating chocolate is said to be correlated with the onset
of a migraine, a short time later. If so, this might be because chocolate causes migraine,
or because a migraine and a craving for chocolate are both effects of some underlying
physiological cause (a common cause, as causal modellers say).
In the discussion in [8], it is assumed that the explanation of a correlation between
measurement settings and underlying particle properties would have to be of the latter
kind. In other words, it would have to be due to some common cause in the overlap of
the past lightcones of the setting and the particle. Call this the Common Past Hypothesis
(CPH). In Figure 2, adapted from a famous diagram due to Bell himself, the common cause
is shown affecting both the measurement setting a on the left, and ‘beables’ λ on the right
(which in turn can affect the measurement outcome B).
Figure 2. The Common Past Hypothesis (CPH).
In the case that I had in mind, however, the causal structure was different. As
with chocolate-causing migraines, the correlation was to be explained by the hypothesis
that the properties of the incoming particle were themselves causally influenced by the
measurement settings. Of course, unlike in the chocolate and migraine case, this causal
influence needed to work from future to past—it was retrocausality, as we now say. Setting
aside for the moment the unfamiliarity of that idea—I am aware that some readers will see
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it as the elephant in the ointment for this proposal—the difference between this explanation
of correlations and the one involving a common cause is as stark as in the migraine case.
They are completely different hypotheses.
Normally, of course, we take the measurement settings themselves to have causes
in their own past, namely the choices of human experimenters, or the devices to which
we humans delegate control. Adding this to the picture, we get the kind of causal model
depicted in Figure 3. The green arrow from the left represents the experimenter’s choice
of the measurement setting a, and the black arrows represent the effect of this choice on λ
and hence on B. A similar path would have to operate from right to left, of course. Note
that nothing hangs on the fact that the green arrow is shown acting from outside the past
lightcone (we will see that it is relevant that it comes from ‘outside’ in a different sense—it
is an experimental intervention, of a kind that is universal in science).
Figure 3. The Common Future Hypothesis (CFH).
In this second model, the correlation between measurement choices and earlier par-
ticle properties is explained in the future, by the fact that the particle encounters the
measurement device there—a device whose setting, in turn, is determined by an earlier
choice on the part of the experimenter. Accordingly, let us call this the Common Future
Hypothesis (CFH).
It is easy to see how both CPH and CFH might lead someone to fatalism. However, it
is crucial to see that they do so by very different routes. In the case of CPH, measurement
settings are treated as effects of the postulated common cause. In the language of the
causal modelling framework, the measurement settings are therefore being treated as
endogenous variables (meaning, as Hitchcock puts it, ‘that their values are determined
by other variables in the model’ [11]). Here, already, we have a stark contrast with the
normal status of experimental settings in scientific models. Normally these are exogenous,
‘meaning that their values are determined outside of the system’ [11]. It is easy to see
how this change of status might seem incompatible with a very down-to-earth sense
of experimental freedom—and might seem, as Wiseman puts it, to ‘undercut the core
assumptions necessary to undertake scientific experiments’ [12].
This objection goes back at least to Bell’s discussion with Shimony, Clauser, and Horne
in [8] (an exchange originally published in 1976). As Shimony, Clauser, and Horne put it:
In any scientific experiment in which two or more variables are supposed to be
randomly selected, one can always conjecture that some factor in the overlap
of the backwards light cones has controlled the presumably random choices.
But, we maintain, skepticism of this sort will essentially dismiss all results of
scientific experimentation. Unless we proceed under the assumption that hidden
conspiracies of this sort do not occur, we have abandoned in advance the whole
enterprise of discovering the laws of nature by experimentation.
This challenge to CPH seems to me to be entirely correct. As I say, however, what I
had in mind was CFH. From the beginning at Wolfson College in 1977, I had taken the
interesting and questionable assumption to be the claim that the properties of the particles
could not depend on future measurement settings. CPH does not challenge that assumption
at all. It simply makes both the measurement settings and the particle properties depend
on some third thing in their common past.
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This means that I have not been bothered by these objections to CPH. They do not
trouble CFH, where there is no bar to treating measurement settings as exogenous variables
(that is the sense in which the green arrow in Figure 3 ‘comes from outside’). In CFH,
the threat of fatalism comes from the fact that the particle ’already knows’ the choice of
measurement setting, before it is made. In the case of an observation on a photon from a
distant galaxy, for example, the model requires that the particle has ‘known’ for billions of
years what the measurement setting would be. Is that not incompatible with the ordinary
belief that we have a free choice in the matter?
At this point I felt there were two things to say. First, this argument is logically
identical to an ancient argument for fatalism, an argument starting from the assumption
that statements about the future have determinate truth values. Theologians once worried
about problems in this vicinity. Does not God’s knowledge of the future deprive us of free
will, for example? Leibniz discusses such issues, noting that ‘the sophism which ends in a
decision to trouble oneself over nothing will haply be useful sometimes to induce certain
people to face danger fearlessly’ [13] (153). In the following instance the strategic fatalist is
Henry V, admonishing Westmoreland for wishing for reinforcements for their impending
battle at Agincourt:
No, my fair cousin:
If we are mark’d to die, we are enow
To do our country loss; and if to live,
The fewer men the greater share of honour. (Henry V, Act IV, Sc. III)
If the concern about fatalism in CFH amounts to no more than this, it is a very damp
squib indeed. Physicists should not allow themselves to be mugged by medieval kings
and theologians.
Second, and more interestingly, the concern about CFH might rest on issues about
causal loops. Suppose we could find out the relevant property of the incoming particle,
before it reaches the measuring device, and use the information to change the measurement
setting. Contradiction? This is a reasonable concern, but as I noted already in [6], Dum-
mett’s work identifies the solution. Backward causation is safe from such concerns, so long
as it is impossible to ‘find out’ about the effect in question, before the choice of the future
setting on which it depends. The restrictions that quantum theory puts on measurements
seemed to offer a prospect that it could exploit Dummett’s loophole.
For these reasons, I felt that in the case of CFH, concerns about fatalism were unwar-
ranted. This left me eventually with the following view about Bell’s position, extrapolated
from his letter. Either Bell had not sufficiently distinguished CPH and CFH in his own
thinking, and was assuming that the (valid) concern about the former would also en-
compass that latter. Or he had distinguished them, and was relying on a much more
questionable argument for fatalism in the latter case. This is what I meant when I said that
Bell’s letter did not resolve my sense of puzzlement. Perhaps there was some some third
option that I was missing, but I could not see what it would be.
It would be nice to be able to report that these issues are more clearly understood
these days, but confusion persists in some quarters. In particular, it still seems to be
widely believed that ruling out CPH would be sufficient to close the loophole in Bell’s
Theorem associated with Statistical Independence. These quotations are from two recent
pieces ([14,15]) by Anton Zeilinger and collaborators, for example:
The freedom-of-choice loophole refers to the requirement, formulated by Bell,
that the setting choices are “free or random” [16] (232). For instance, this would
prohibit a possible interdependence between the choice of measurement settings
and the properties of the system being measured.
A ... major loophole, known variously as the freedom-of-choice, measurement-
independence, or setting-independence loophole ..., concerns the choice of mea-
surement settings. In particular, the derivation of Bell’s inequality explicitly
assumes that there is no statistical correlation between the choices of measure-
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ment settings and anything else that causally affects both measurement outcomes.
Bell himself observed 40 years ago that, “It has been assumed that the settings of
instruments are in some sense free variables—say at the whim of experimenters—
or in any case not determined in the overlap of the backward light cones”.
In both cases here, it is simply taken for granted that the only avenue for statistical
dependence between measurement settings and ‘anything else that causally affects both
measurement outcomes’ is one that involves some common cause, acting in the past (the
second paper claims to be ‘pushing back by ~600 years the most recent time by which any
local-realist influences could have engineered the observed Bell violation’).
I do not want to overstate this claim of confusion. Some recent writers are admirably
clear that CFH, or retrocausality, is a distinct proposal for rejecting Statistical Independence
(Leifer [3] links it to the option of rejecting the ontological models framework; see [17,18]
for recent surveys). Moreover, we now have a better understanding of the issue of the
relationship between time-symmetry and retrocausality, another factor in my interest in
the case from the beginning. My own result [19], extended and generalised by Leifer and
Pusey [20,21], shows how in quantum theory time-symmetry may require retrocausality,
for a reason not present in the classical case. As Leifer and Pusey note, the argument
depends on thinking about time-like analogues of EPR-Bell arguments: The EPR argument
in my case, and Bell’s extension in theirs.
For me, the effect of this recent work has been to increase my sense that nature is
offering us a loud hint in Bell’s results, a hint to which many people interested in these
topics are curiously deaf (If anything, I now feel that there are two hints, one from Lorentz
invariance and one from time-symmetry). As always, however, I am conscious that there
may be objections of principle that I cannot see, and that Bell did see, perhaps. If there
is any trace of such objections in Bell’s letter from 1988, I am hoping that this discussion
will unearth it. I am also conscious that I have not yet touched on the idea of so-called
‘superdeterminism’, or the suggestion that something objectionably ‘conspiratorial’ is
required for a proposal such as CFH. Again, if there is a valid objection to CFH of this kind,
I am hoping this discussion will highlight and clarify it.
Before I yield the floor to my colleague, let me mention again the (supposed) elephant
in the ointment for CFH, the idea of backward causation itself. As noted above, my own
early discussion of these ideas took a deliberate path via some classic philosophical work on
the issue, that of Michael Dummett [4,5]. Since those early days, I have written extensively
on the issue of the direction of causation [10,22]. In those investigations, I have not yet
found anything that ought to count as a fly in the ointment for CFH, much less an elephant.
On the contrary, Dummett’s identification of a loophole in objections based on causal loops
remains precisely the fly-free balm that CFH requires, in my view.
I know of one place where Bell himself discusses backward causation explicitly. In ‘La
Nouvelle Cuisine’, seeking a characterisation of the sense of locality apparently implied
by special relativity, he suggests that it might be defined in terms of cause and effect [16]
(235):
As far as I know, this was first argued by Einstein, in the context of special
relativity theory. In 1907, he pointed out that if an effect followed its cause sooner
than light could propagate from the one place to the other, then in some other
inertial frames of reference the ‘effect’ would come before the ‘cause’! He wrote:
. . . in my opinion, regarded as pure logic . . . it contains no contra-
dictions; however it absolutely clashes with the character of our total
experience, and in this way is proved the impossibility of the hypothesis
. . . of a causal chain going faster than light.
Bell goes on to explain what Einstein had in mind—a case of causal loops, exploiting
the fact that the effects precede their causes in some inertial frames. Perhaps this is
evidence that Bell himself thought that backward causation is excluded by these causal
loop arguments. If so, then the escape hatch he needed is close at hand. All such arguments
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depend on the assumption that backward causation could be used to signal (to tell one’s
grandmother to avoid her unhappy marriage to one’s grandfather, perhaps, in the classic
paradox). However as Bell himself made clear, the Bell correlations imply causality without
signalling. So long as retrocausality stays on the same side of the line, it is safe from
paradox (once again, this is Dummett’s loophole, in effect).
As for Einstein’s own attitude to retrocausality, this little fragment suggests an ad-
mirable and characteristically empirical attitude. The objection is that ‘it absolutely clashes
with the character of our total experience’. Of course, Einstein did not know about the ‘as-
pect’ of our total experience that was to be revealed by Bell’s work, and by the experiments
it inspired. So it would be presumptuous, to say the least, to read into Einstein’s remarks
any general prohibition on retrocausal models.
3. Norsen (I)
Thanks to Huw for inviting me to join him in what promises to be an illuminating
dialogue and for perfectly setting the context with that beautiful opening statement.
Since it does not involve any direct interaction with (or letters from) Bell, my own
personal biography vis-a-vis Bell’s theorem is far less interesting than Huw’s. But in so far
as I can reconstruct it, I can report that I first learned of Bell’s theorem from David Albert’s
book ’Quantum Mechanics and Experience’ [23], which I stumbled across at Orca Books in
downtown Olympia, Washington (USA) during the winter vacation in the middle of my
sophomore year of college, which would have been late 1994 or early 1995 (i.e., about four
years after Bell’s untimely death). Albert’s book (and the many other books and articles
on the foundations of QM (Quantum Mechanics) that I subsequently began to devour)
made a significant impression on me and gave me a youthful confidence to raise skeptical
questions about orthodox quantum mechanics as it was presented in my physics courses.
Given what I now know of the typical attitudes toward quantum foundations in the
physics community, it is rather surprising that my undergraduate professors during this
period were so incredibly supportive of my interests in unorthodox viewpoints. However
they must have found my passion at least a little naive, and, in hindsight, I can now see
that they were not completely wrong.
Huw remembers questioning a very specific and subtle assumption in Bell’s theorem
the first time he encountered it. For me the story is very different. I spent years knowing
that Bell’s theorem was crucially important, simply because everybody unanimously
agreed that it was, but having basically no clear idea at all what to make of it, because
different authors all seemed to present their own totally unique version of the theorem’s
logical structure. David Albert had claimed that Bell’s theorem proved that nature was
non-local, but other commentators told very different stories, usually along the lines of:
Bell had refuted determinism, or the related and EPR-inspired hidden-variables program,
and had therefore put the final nail in Einstein’s coffin and proved once and for all that the
orthodox interpretation of Bohr and Heisenberg was the only viable one.
Some semblance of clarity only emerged while I was in graduate school (nominally
pursuing a PhD in theoretical nuclear astrophysics but really spending at least half of my
time secretly studying quantum foundations), when it finally occurred to me that perhaps
Bell himself might have an illuminating perspective on his own theorem. Reading Bell’s
collected papers [16] turned out to be very helpful indeed. Even his more technical papers
were completely accessible and clear, and Bell’s ability to explain his reasoning, crisply
and cleverly, was truly masterful. I went from having no idea what Bell’s theorem actually
proved, to having no idea how any controversy could remain when Bell had laid everything
out so perfectly.
Huw’s opening statement focused mostly on the notion of Statistical Independence,
which is the main focus of discussion. However to set the context and pre-empt any
possible misunderstanding or miscommunication, I think it will be helpful to step back
and lay out the overall structure of Bell’s theorem (at least as Bell himself understood it
and helped me to understand it).
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There are two assumptions. One is the Statistical Independence that Huw has discussed,
according to which (in the usual EPR-Bell sort of setup) the measurement settings a and
b are “free” or “exogenous” and therefore (at least as long as we set aside the idea of
retro-causation that Huw wants us to consider) uncorrelated with the variables λ, which
characterize the physical state of the particle pair at some earlier time. There will be much
more to say about this assumption as the discussion proceeds.
However I wanted to make sure to acknowledge explicitly that there is also another
assumption—which Bell and I and most others would consider in some sense the more
central and important assumption—namely, Local Causality. Bell’s careful and important
mathematical formulation of this notion is intended to capture the qualitative idea, moti-
vated by relativity, that the causal influences on a given event are to be found exclusively in
that event’s past light cone, and the causal influences of a given event (on other events) are
to be found exclusively in the future light cone. The idea, in short, is that causal influences
propagate (from the past toward the future) always at the speed of light or slower. Readers
unfamiliar with Bell’s formulation of Local Causality are urged to read his final and clearest
presentation in “La Nouvelle Cuisine” [16] (232) and/or my own dissection in “J.S. Bell’s
Concept of Local Causality” [24].
As a brief aside that will be relevant later, let me stress here that the core virtue of Bell’s
formulation of Local Causality is that it is totally and completely generic. The formulation is
not in terms of the proprietary concepts (e.g., quantum mechanical wave functions) of some
specific candidate theory, but is exclusively in terms of the un-sectarian notion that Bell
invented for the purpose: “Beables”, which simply means whatever some candidate theory
posits to exist. And (unlike for example the conditions known as “Parameter Independence”
and “Outcome Independence”) Bell’s Local Causality does not make reference to any specific
type of process or situation and in particular does not imply or require any sub-classification
of beables into distinct sub-types (e.g., those which are human-controllable “parameters”
vs. those which are uncontrollable “outcomes”).
Bell’s concept of Local Causality, that is, possesses the same virtues that Bell demanded
of candidate theories when he complained that orthodox quantum theory, with its special
ad hoc rules for how systems behave during measurements, was “unprofessionally vague
and ambiguous” [16] (173). As he elaborated elsewhere, terms such as measurement,
observable, system, and apparatus “...however legitimate and necessary [they might be] in
application, have no place in a formulation with any pretension to physical precision” [16]
(215). To avoid suffering from the sort of “measurement problem” that afflicts orthodox
quantum theory, Bell thought, the ontological posits and dynamical laws of a proper
candidate fundamental theory should be stated in precise mathematical way, without
vague, anthropocentric terms or distinctions. Bell thus appreciated the professionalism
of various unorthodox formulations of quantum theory such as the pilot-wave theory,
spontaneous collapse theory, and (to a lesser extent) Everett’s many-worlds theory and we
should appreciate the professionalism of Bell’s Local Causality on similar grounds.
Returning to Bell’s theorem, the two assumptions, Local Causality and Statistical In-
dependence, turn out to jointly entail something (“Bell’s inequality”) which I think Huw
and I will agree is now known, from experiment, to be false. So at least one of the two
assumptions—Local Causality and Statistical Independence—must be rejected.
Bell’s view, and the view that I and many other commentators have tended to adopt,
is that Statistical Independence is something like an unquestionable assumption of empirical
science, the denial of which amounts to endorsing a kind of cosmic conspiracy theory.
Indeed, in one important earlier article on Bell’s theorem [25], my co-authors and I called
the Statistical Independence assumption by the alternative name “No Conspiracies”—much,
no doubt, to the annoyance of Huw and others of his ilk.
As part of this opening statement let me just stipulate for the record that Huw is
entirely correct to insist that the idea of backwards-in-time causation—the Common Future
Hypothesis, CFH—potentially provides (or at least appears to potentially provide) a non-
conspiratorial way of violating the Statistical Independence assumption. So this very much
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deserves to be peeled apart and examined carefully, hence my excitement to participate in
this dialogue.
However I have a big-picture question that I think should be addressed here at the
outset. The people who want to deny the Statistical Independence assumption—not on the
basis of retrocausation and the CFH, but rather on the basis of the CPH and hence what
Huw and I would agree is a scientifically-unacceptable kind of conspiracy—want to do so
in order to save Local Causality. That is, the end-game of the conspiracy theorists is to find
a way of reconciling the relativity-based idea that causal influences propagate (from the
past toward the future) always at the speed of light or slower, with the empirical violation
of Bell’s inequality.
However, this cannot be your endgame, Huw, since (as I have tried to stress) the other
premise of Bell’s theorem, Local Causality, also has a (not merely statistical) arrow of time
built into it. We could put the point like this. The kind of retro-causation that you want to
use to provide a non-conspiratorial ground for rejecting Statistical Independence, also just
blatantly and openly violates Bell’s notion of Local Causality; it says, after all, that the causal
influences on certain events are to be found in their future light cones. Thus, apparently,
despite both focusing skeptical attention on the Statistical Independence assumption, you are
not at all trying to achieve the same thing as the conspiracy theorists. So what exactly are
you trying to achieve?
I think I have a sense of what your answer will be, but I am sure it will help focus the
subsequent discussion to have this laid out explicitly.
4. Price (II)
Travis mentions a fateful Olympian encounter with Albert’s excellent book, ’Quantum
Mechanics and Experience’, which led him into quantum foundations. This gives me an
opportunity to recommend Travis’s own recent text, ’Foundations of Quantum Mechanics’.
Contemporary versions of the 1990s Travis, or the 1970s me, would be just as lucky to
encounter this book as he was to encounter Albert’s—in some ways, even more so. Among
other things, Travis’s book, unlike Albert’s, offers a rich sense of engagement with the
founders of quantum foundations—Einstein, Bell, and many others. Travis achieves this
by working in well-chosen words from these greats, and I will draw on some of those in
a moment.
Travis points out a contrast between retrocausalists such as me, who look for a viola-
tion of Statistical Independence via what I have called CFH, and those we are now labelling
conspiracy theorists, who do so via CPH. As Travis says, proponents of CPH are trying to
save Bell’s principle Local Causality. That can not be my goal, because, as he puts it, Local
Causality has an “arrow of time built into it”. So what exactly am I trying to achieve? It is a
good question. The main part of my answer is that I want to defend a more basic sense of
Locality, and show how the world might violate Bell’s Local Causality but respect the more
basic notion.
What is the more basic notion? Here it is in the words of Einstein, quoted by Bell, in a
passage reproduced in Travis’s book:
The following idea characterises the relative independence of objects far apart in
space (A and B): External influence on A has no direct influence on B. [26] (109)
Let us call this Einstein Locality. Retrocausal models want to preserve Einstein Locality
at the cost of Bell’s Local Causality—at the same time explaining why this is not much of a
cost at all, once we understand the limitations of Bell’s version. The major limitation is the
way in which Local Causality simply builds in a causal arrow of time. Einstein Locality says
nothing about time—we could replace ‘far apart in space’ with ‘far apart in spacetime, in
any direction’ and still have much the same idea.
Travis describes the ideas that Bell’s Local Causality is intended to capture like this:
Bell’s . . . mathematical formulation . . . is intended to capture the qualitative idea,
motivated by relativity, that the causal influences on a given event are to be found
exclusively in that event’s past light cone, and the causal influences of a given
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event . . . are to be found exclusively in the future light cone. The idea, in short, is
that causal influences propagate (from the past toward the future) always at the
speed of light or slower.
There are two parts to this qualitative idea, one the restriction to lightcones motivated
by relativity, and other—much older, obviously—that causal influences propagate from past
to future. Let us call the latter the Causal Arrow of Time, or CAT for short. Note that CAT
actually combines two things, first a distinction between cause and effect, and second the
claim that the cause–effect ‘arrow’ lines up with the earlier–later ‘arrow’ (unless the causal
relation is itself asymmetric, it makes no sense to say that it points in a particular direction).
A generation before Schrödinger’s famous feline, this CAT played a role in the most
notorious rejection of causation in modern philosophy. In 1912, Bertrand Russell argued
that modern physics had no use for causation, and that philosophy should therefore
discard it too: “The law of causation,” Russell said, “like much that passes muster among
philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it
is erroneously supposed to do no harm” [27]. One of Russell’s main arguments is that
there is no asymmetric relation in physics that we could identify with causation. The
computer scientist Judea Pearl, himself a leading contemporary writer on causation, sums
up Russell’s point like this: “[T]he laws of physics are all symmetrical, going both ways,
while causal relations are unidirectional, going from cause to effect” [28].
Russell’s argument had little practical effect, and indeed, as Patrick Suppes pointed
out later [29], physicists themselves often use causal notions. Still, Russell had put his
finger on a puzzle—‘Russell’s enigma’, as Pearl calls it. As Pearl says:
[V]ery few physicists paid attention to Russell’s enigma. They continued to write
equations in the office and talk cause-effect in the cafeteria; with astonishing
success they smashed the atom, invented the transistor and the laser. [28]
The long debate about nonlocality shows that it is not just in the cafeteria that these
things matter in physics, but this makes the enigma all the more urgent. What is this
asymmetric relation doing in physics—or anywhere else, for that matter, in a world built
on the symmetric laws of physics?
Simplifying a bit, we can distinguish three contemporary accounts of CAT (see [22]
for discussion and references).
1. A matter of definition. Following Hume, we can treat CAT as a matter of definition.
This view holds that the basic relations of dependence are among the symmetric
relations identified by physics, and the terms ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ are just labels for the
earlier and later of a pair of events related in this way;
2. Thermodynamics. We can try to explain CAT in terms of the thermodynamic arrow of
time (and in particular the so-called Past Hypothesis, or low entropy initial boundary
condition). This view has been defended in recent years by writers such as Kutach,
Albert, and Loewer;
3. Interventionism. The third possibility seems to originate with Frank Ramsey [30].
Ramsey, one of the fathers of the subjectivist approach to probability, takes a simi-
lar line on causation. As he puts it, “from the situation when we are deliberating
seems to . . . arise the difference of cause and effect”. In effect, Ramsey proposes an
explanation of the time-asymmetry of causation (indeed, causality itself) in terms
of the epistemic perspective of agents like us. This approach has been influential in
recent decades, thanks to the work of writers such as Jim Woodward, and Judea Pearl
himself [28,31]. It is now called Interventionism, alluding to the central role of the
idea of intervening on a system of interest—reaching in ‘from the outside’, to fix the
value of an exogenous variable.
None of these accounts of CAT seem much use to Bell, seeking to build a fundamental
causal arrow into a principle for quantum foundations. The first is empty, since it makes a
matter of definition that effects are later than their causes. (It would have nothing to say
about probabilistic dependence between hidden variables and future measurement settings,
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though it would prohibit us from calling it ‘causality’.) The second seems insufficiently
fundamental. On the face of it, we want a theory of the quantum world that is independent
of the thermodynamic environment in which a system happens to be embedded. And
the third seems insufficiently fundamental for a different reason. Its dependence on the
perspective of agents like us seems deeply in tension with Bell’s desire, as Travis puts it, to
avoid ‘anthropocentric terms or distinctions’.
For Interventionism, anthropocentricity about CAT is only one part of a broader issue.
As Pearl himself makes clear, the role of intervention threatens the idea that causation itself
is fundamental:
If you wish to include the entire universe in the model, causality disappears
because interventions disappear—the manipulator and the manipulated lose their
distinction. However, scientists rarely consider the entirety of the universe as an
object of investigation. In most cases the scientist carves a piece from the universe
and proclaims that piece in—namely, the focus of investigation. The rest of the
universe is then considered out or background and is summarised by what we call
boundary conditions. This choice of ins and outs creates asymmetry in the way
we look at things, and it is this asymmetry that permits us to talk about “outside
intervention” and hence about causality and cause-effect directionality. [28]
In case you feel tempted to respond ‘so much the worse for Interventionism’, look
again at Einstein Locality. As Einstein says, “External influence on A has no direct influence
on B”. That looks very much like Interventionism. It is doubtful if we can formulate
any notion of Locality, or indeed any causal notions at all, without implicitly relying on
intervention. It is built into assumptions about what we treat as exogenous variables.
However perhaps we can at least do without an anthropocentric temporal arrow?
After all, does physics not permit a time-symmetric notion of intervention? At least in a
deterministic framework, we might interpret Einstein’s ‘external influence’ in terms of an
imagined change to properties in a small region of a Cauchy surface at an intermediate
time. Such a change, propagated forwards and backwards in accordance with the relevant
dynamical laws, will ‘produce’ changes elsewhere (Here’s a more homely example I once
used elsewhere. Consider the perspective of someone planning to remake the entire series
of Star Wars movies, with some tweaks to central characters. The prequels are required
to be consistent with the original Episode IV, and hence tweaks made there will affect the
plots of the remakes in both directions. If we substitute Harry Potter for Luke Skywalker
the ramifications will spread backwards as well as forwards in the temporal dimension
of the series). Intuitively, Einstein Locality would be the requirement that such changes
propagate only by continuous processes within the lightcones. (Spacelike influences would
be allowed, but only indirectly, by indirect zig zags via the lightcones).
This may be a good way to capture the sense of causality that matters to relativity,
where the idea that there is some sort of fundamental temporal asymmetry seems entirely
gratuitous. It might seem an attractive approach for a retrocausalist, too, but I think it
throws out far too much, in two senses. First, working science is simply not like this,
either in the cafeteria or the laboratory. Our ordinary notions of causality, in science as in
everyday life, are those of agents embedded in time with a particular temporal orientation.
Throwing all that away would leave the view hostage to the objection rightly raised against
CPH that it is incompatible with the assumptions we need to do science. (As I explained
above, CFH is immune from that objection.)
Even more seriously, this symmetric option simply obscures the subtle idea at the core
of the retrocausalist proposal. This idea is that even by the lights of the ordinary asymmetric
perspective, it is possible that the world contains an indirect kind of retrocausality—hard-
to-notice cases in which by intervening in the future, we can make a difference in the past.
Summing up, I want to make three points. First, nothing we know about CAT justifies
taking it as fundamental, in the sense in which Bell’s Local Causality differs from Einstein
Locality. Second, it is doubtful whether Locality, or indeed any interesting notion of
causality, can be captured qualitatively in wholly fundamental terms. The right response
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to this is not to abandon talk of causality in physics. Instead we should keep a close eye
on the role of the agent’s perspective, in order to keep in mind a question like this: What
sort of fundamental structure looks like this from here? (Travis, I think we are on the same
page in wanting such a story).
Third, coming back to something I mentioned briefly above, we are going to need
a distinction between direct and indirect spacelike influence. Einstein Locality rules out
the direct kind, but not apparently the indirect kind. This was clear to the pioneer of the
approach, Olivier Costa de Beauregard, who pointed out a decade before Bell’s Theorem
that zig zag causality, via the past lightcones, provided a potential loophole in the EPR
argument [32]. It offered spacelike influence, without action at a distance. This distinction
is still missed in some quarters. The following example is from an email I received from an
experimentalist known for work in confirming the Bell correlations:
For me, [the] Costa de Beauregard zig zag in space time, which you seem to
consider equivalent to retrocausation, is nothing else than nonlocality. The
addition of one time-like vector to the past and one time-like vector to the future,
connecting the detections, results in a space-like vector, and a causal relation
between both ends, spacelike separated, amounts to a non local relation.
As I said, Costa de Beauregard originally thought of his idea as a challenge to EPR. The
EPR argument assumes an intuitive notion of Locality, in arguing that measurement choices
at A cannot affect measurement outcomes at a remote location B. Costa de Beauregard’s
point was that if we allow causal influence in both directions within the lightcones, and
adapt our notion of Locality accordingly, this argument no longer works. There is now a
zig zag path for local causal influence to reach from A to B.
Thus in answer to your question, Travis, Costa de Beauregard’s zig zag is still the
endpoint that I have in mind. As you rightly point out, it involves rejecting Bell’s version
of Local Causality. But for the reasons I have sketched, the crucial thing that we need to
drop—that is, CAT, the causal arrow of time—is on shaky grounds anyway, as a principle
for fundamental physics. And Einstein’s formulation of Locality from 1948 looks like the
alternative that we need (I once met Costa de Beauregard, late in his life. I asked him when
he had first had the idea for the zig zag, which he first published in 1953. He said in the
late 1940s, when he had been a student of de Broglie; but that de Broglie would not let
him publish it, until they saw Feynman’s work treating positrons as electrons zig-zagging
backwards in time).
5. Norsen (II)
There is a lot going on in that response, all of it very helpful in moving us toward
what I see as a possible way of making sense of Bell’s perhaps-puzzling dismissiveness
about “fatalism”. It may take some time to connect the various threads, though.
So, Huw, your vision involves rejecting both Statistical Independence and Bell’s Local
Causality. But you would hope to preserve a different, time-symmetric notion of locality in
which the causal influences on a given event cannot be at space-like separation from it, but
are equally allowed to be in either the past- or the future-light-cone. You suggest calling
this alternative notion “Einstein Locality” and suggest that it is well-captured by a passage
from Einstein’s 1948 essay. For the record, and despite my appreciation of your praise
of the book you quoted the passage from, I have serious reservations about basing the
particular time-symmetric notion of locality that you have in mind on that particular (by the
way, translated) passage, and thus attributing your proposed locality concept to Einstein.
But a debate about exactly how to parse Einstein’s words will be a pointless distraction
here since you have made it abundantly clear what you have in mind. So, having noted
my reservation, I will simply follow you in describing your proposed time-symmetric
alternative to Bell’s Local Causality as “Einstein Locality”.
My main concern (other than the terminology) about “Einstein Locality” is that, as
you acknowledge, “we’re going to need a distinction between direct and indirect space-
like influences”. From your point of view, the whole purpose of Einstein Locality is to
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endorse, as compatible with “the sense of causality that matters to relativity”, the zig-zag
sort of multi-step, “indirect” causal influence across space-like separation that Bell’s Local
Causality prohibits. Without this distinction between “direct” and “indirect”, we would
be stuck saying that Einstein Locality allows the very thing that it poses as prohibiting
(namely, causal influence across space-like separation). In that case, Einstein Locality
wouldn’t actually prohibit anything, i.e., it would be rather empty and pointless.
As I think we agree, it thus seems that your proposal of replacing Bell’s Local Causality
with Einstein Locality swims or sinks with the project of situating this distinction between
“direct” and “indirect” influences in the context of fundamental physics. And my initial
gut reaction is that this project seems rather hopeless. When I look at extant theories
that possess the appropriate sort of professionalism (e.g., Maxwellian electrodynamics,
general relativity, some non-orthodox version of quantum theory) I see causal influences
taking the form of continuous propagation. There is nothing “atomic”, for example, about
the sequence of steps whereby one charged particle affects the motion of another nearby
charged particle via the intermediary electric and magnetic field. There are, if you like, a
continuous infinity of infinitesimal intermediating steps, but in my opinion that description
should be understood as a human theorist’s perspective on something that is, in reality, a
seamless whole.
So is one charged particle exerting force on another nearby charged particle a “direct”
influence (because the process is a seamless whole) or an “indirect” influence (because it
can be viewed as consisting of an infinite number of infinitesimal sub-steps)? I think the
only good answer is to reject the question and whatever line of thinking motivated us to
pose it.
Huw, I hope you will correct me if I am wrong, but I get the impression that instead of
trying to find a sharp distinction between direct and indirect influences in fundamental
physics, you perhaps want to ground that distinction in an appeal to the concept of
causation itself, and in particular the notion of “intervention”, without which, you said,
we probably cannot formulate “any notion of Locality, or indeed any causal notions at all”
(Incidentally, is not Bell’s Local Causality a counterexample there? It does not explicitly
involve, and does not appear to me to implicitly rely on, the idea of “intervention”). It
may well be true that if we restrict our use of cause-and-effect terminology to processes
involving agent-intervention, it might provide a clean way to say, for example, that the zig-
zag influence depicted in Figure 3, from the setting a to the space-like separated outcome B
(via the particle pair state λ), is unambiguously indirect. Both the setting a and the pair state
λ are after all (at least in part) exogenous: Somebody sets the setting, and somebody sets
up the equipment in a certain way to produce particle pairs in a certain state (or a certain
distribution of possible states), and both of those interventions are inputs to (not subjects
of) the model in question there. In short, we have, in this case, two distinct interventions,
which (on this view) implies the two distinct causal influences symbolised, in Figure 3,
with the two distinct black arrows. Maybe this could be said to render the effect of a on the
space-like separated B unambiguously indirect.
However to me this kind of proposal for grounding the distinction between direct
and indirect causal influences also seems highly suspicious and implausible. We want, at
the end of the day, an account of fundamental physics that is not afflicted by anything like
a “measurement problem”, i.e., we want to avoid the use of, or need for, anthropocentric
or otherwise “unprofessionally vague and ambiguous” concepts and distinctions at the
fundamental level. We want, as you quote Pearl as saying, ultimately “to include the
entire universe in the model”. And, when we do that, I think it is exactly right that
“interventions disappear”.
Of course, Pearl goes on to suggest that, in practice, “scientists rarely consider the
entirety of the universe as an object of investigation”, that models always (or almost always)
include some parts of the world only as boundary conditions, and that “this ... permits us
to talk about ‘outside intervention”’. That may well all be true, but I would nevertheless
find a formulation of Einstein Locality which required explicit reference to “intervention”
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(to ground the distinction between direct and indirect influences) to be squarely in the
“unprofessionally vague and ambiguous” category.
Incidentally, it might surprise some readers to know that Bell, who of course invented
and applied the concept of Local Causality, was in some sense very sympathetic to at least
part of the view that Huw quoted Pearl describing as “Russell’s enigma”, i.e., the idea that,
at the level of fundamental physics, causality (at least described as such) is nowhere to be
found. After presenting his formulation of Local Causality in “La Nouvelle Cuisine”, for
example, Bell remarks:
Note, by the way, that our definition of locally causal theories, although motivated
by talk of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’, does not in the end explicitly involve these rather
vague notions. [16] (240)
This, however, does not mean that (appropriately “professional”) theories do not
describe processes which can legitimately be characterised in causal language. Bell once
wrote that, in “pursuing [his] profession of theoretical physics” he was required to “insist
... on the distinction between analysing various physical theories, on the one hand, and
philosophizing about the unique real world on the other hand” [16] (101) Continuing:
In this matter of causality it is a great inconvenience that the real world is given
to us once only. We cannot know what would have happened if something had
been different. We cannot repeat an experiment changing just one variable; the
hands of the clock will have moved, and the moons of Jupiter. Physical theories
are more amenable in this respect. We can calculate the consequences of changing
free element in a theory, be they only initial conditions, and so can explore the
causal structure of the theory. [16] (101)
This comment occurred in the context of explaining that his concept of Local Causality
(and, for example, the conditional probabilities which appear in its formulation) should
be understood as referring to theories (which are, in turn, candidate descriptions of the
unique real world) rather than to the unique real world directly. Physical theories (at least
the serious ones that aspire to fundamentality) thus not only, in Bell’s view, have “causal
structures”, they are our best and necessary tool for, in the long term, discovering the
causal structure of the real world.
Anyway, le me summarise my concern about “Einstein Locality”. I fear that, unlike
Bell’s Local Causality, this notion will never be formulatable in a meaningful and appro-
priately fundamental way that accomplishes, Huw, what you want it to accomplish. I
fear, in particular, that it will be impossible to cleanly distinguish “direct” from “indirect”
influences in an appropriately “professional” manner, and I fear that, without the termino-
logical check provided by an appeal to explicit “interventions”, an Einstein Local theory of
the sort you claim to want will be riddled through with the sort of causal influences across
space-like separation that (however you might want to classify them) are just prima facie
contrary to “the sense of causality that matters to relativity” (On this last point, I am in
complete agreement with your experimentalist correspondent).
In the same discussion with Shimony, Clauser, and Horne that has been referenced
several times already, Bell wrote, about the idea of saving Local Causality by rejecting
Statistical Independence via the CPH:
A theory may appear in which such conspiracies inevitably occur, and these con-
spiracies may then seem more digestible than the nonlocalities of other theories.
When that theory is announced I will not refuse to listen, either on methodological
or other grounds. But I will not myself try to make such a theory. [16] (103)
I feel this same way about the idea of rejecting both Local Causality and Statistical
Independence but preserving “the sense of causality that matters to relativity” with some
notion of Einstein Locality. I doubt this could be done, and so am not interested in
spending my own time and effort on the project, but would be delighted to listen if and
when somebody puts forward a precise formulation of Einstein Locality and/or a concrete
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example of a candidate fundamental theory which shows, if only in principle, how this
project could work.
Am I correct, Huw, that neither exists at present? I have to admit that I was somewhat
confused by your proposal to formulate Einstein Locality “in terms of an imagined change
to properties in a small region of a Cauchy surface at an intermediate time”. That actually
sounded rather promising to me, so I was puzzled that in the end you seemed to reject it as
“throw[ing] out far too much”.
In particular, I did not understand the worry that this was somehow “incompatible
with the assumptions we need to do science”. It seems to me that this formulation is
perfectly compatible with ordinary scientific practice. Indeed, do not several existing
(serious candidate) theories, e.g., Maxwell’s electrodynamics, respect this condition?
It seems to me that your rejection of this formulation—what I think you expressed
when you said that it “obscures the subtle idea at the core of the retrocausalist proposal”—
must be based on the recognition that such theories as Maxwellian electrodynamics
do not appear to support the specific sort of zig-zag causality that would allow for a
non-conspiratorial violation of Statistical Independence. However, it is not clear to me
what would.
Let me try putting all my cards on the table here. In my response so far, I have not
really addressed a core aspect of your proposal, namely, the tension between the apparently
time-symmetric fundamental laws, and Bell’s time-asymmetric Local Causality. You are
clearly committed to the idea that time-symmetry is fundamental; as you explained from
the very beginning, this is the motivation for the whole retrocausalist project. By contrast,
I am more open to the possibility that some kind of Causal Arrow of Time (CAT) may
remain in our fundamental physics. For one, I am not comfortable presupposing that the
fundamental laws will turn out to be deterministic; maybe, as the founders of quantum
mechanics seemed to believe, the world will turn out to be irreducibly stochastic. Although
I never found the arguments of the founders convincing, I do not think this possibility has
been ruled out, and as long as that remains true I think it is premature to insist that the
fundamental laws are time-symmetric. (Of course, it is also not certain that irreducible
stochasticity requires time-asymmetry. But to me at least it does not seem like time-
symmetry and irreducible stochasticity play well together). But even if the fundamental
laws do turn out to be time-symmetric, I am not convinced this means that there can not,
or should not, be something like a fundamental causal arrow of time.
That said, though, such a fundamental CAT, like explicit notions of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’,
may not appear as such, may be relatively invisible, in the formulation of a candidate
fundamental theory—or at least a deterministic candidate fundamental theory. Indeed, in
the context of such theories, my concern about the retrocausalist proposal is not so much
that backward causation is impossible or unconscionable, but rather that the distinction
between forward and backward causation seems to melt away. In Maxwellian electrody-
namics, for example, the state of the particles and fields at one time determines the state
of the particles and fields at a later time. So did the former cause the latter, or vice versa?
The laws of the theory certainly do not answer that question; they just tell us that the
states at the two times are necessarily connected. (This, I take it, was Russell’s point). So is
Maxwellian electrodynamics a retrocausal theory? Maybe? I am honestly not even sure
what the question means.
Of course, at the non-fundamental level, where we model only some narrow part of
the universe and describe its surroundings as “exogenous” variables through which we
might “intervene” on the narrow part under study, the distinction between forward and
backward causation seems much clearer. If the system changes due to an intervention in its
past, that is forward causation, whereas if the system changes due to an intervention in its
future, that is backward causation. But if we demand that the vague and anthropocentric
classification of beables as “endogenous” or “exogenous”—if we demand that reference
to “intervention”—should disappear at the more fundamental level, it just seems like
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the distinction between forward-in-time and backward-in-time influences will have to
disappear too.
So I tend to think that you retrocausalists fool yourself into thinking there is a meaning-
ful program to pursue here, by taking a much too interventionist perspective on causation,
i.e., by thinking too exclusively about very narrow models of specific situations in which
various things are treated explicitly as “exogenous” “interventions”. And in particular
I think that as soon as you try to imagine embedding one of these models, e.g., the one
pictured in Figure 3, into a candidate fundamental theory, in which everything is treated
on an equal footing, the very notion of retrocausation—and with it the distinction between
the CPH and the CFH—will disappear like a mirage.
Could I be wrong about all of this? Absolutely. To me, the easiest and best way to find
out would be to scrutinise a concrete example of a serious candidate fundamental theory
that respects a time-symmetric Einstein Locality condition and which (unlike Maxwellian
electrodynamics?) supports the needed kind of indirect, zig-zag causality in (but only
in) the EPR-Bell type of setup where the retrocausalist needs Statistical Independence to
be violated.
Unfortunately, I do not think any such theory exists at present, and everything I have
said here should make pretty clear why this does not surprise me. But if (or when) I am
wrong, and such a theory is presented, I will not refuse to listen.
In summary, these are what my cards look like. If it turns out I am (at least arguably)
not wrong about all of this, there will be at least a bit more to say about how this relates to
Bell’s apparent conflation of the CPH and the CFH, i.e., his perhaps-puzzling dismissal of
the retrocausality program on the grounds of “fatalism”. However Huw, I think I should
pause here and give you a chance to weigh in on what I have said.
6. Price (III)
In my opening Section 1 described my view that Bell’s Theorem contains a loud hint
from nature. Bell shows that if we assume Statistical Independence (SI), quantum theory
implies nonlocality. The hint turns on the thought that we should read this as a reductio
ad absurdum, and conclude that SI fails in the quantum realm (I do not mean absurdity
in the logical sense, of course, but rather what Newton had in mind, when he said of the
the idea that ‘one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum, without the
mediation of anything else’ that it was ‘so great an absurdity, that . . . no man who has in
philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking, can ever fall into it.’). This would be
the obvious reading if we could already see on the shelf some plausible way in which SI
might fail, but we do not. Looking further back on the shelf there are two possibilities, CPH
and CFH—the former evidently much easier to see, from most vantage points. I suggested
that deafness to the hint might rest on failing to distinguish them, and hence on the view
that Bell’s well-founded objections to CPH would apply to any attempt to abandon SI.
In response, Travis, you pointed out that Bell’s own assumption Local Causality would
still fail in CFH, and asked in what sense I could therefore claim to be defending locality (or
avoiding nonlocality, as the reasoning just described requires). I offered Einstein Locality as
a substitute for Bell’s notion, and you have now said that you doubt whether the distinction
between the two will be expressible in vocabulary permitted by fundamental theory.
It will not matter if this turns out to be the case, in my view, because the argument
can simply fall back on Lorentz Invariance. If we treat a violation of Lorentz Invariance,
and the need for a preferred frame, as the absurdum avoided by giving up SI, then the hint
speaks to us just as before. To put this another way, suppose we concede to my famous
2015 correspondent that Costa de Beauregard’s zig zag proposal still counts as nonlocality.
No matter, so long as the zig zag offers us a path to an explanation of the Bell correlations
that avoids the tension Bell himself saw between quantum theory and special relativity.
It has often been noted that there are two elements to the counterintuitive character of
nonlocality in contemporary physics, the first linked to relativity and the avoidance of
preferred frames, and the second, obviously much older, (See Newton’s remarks above.)
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to the counterintuitiveness of action at a distance itself. A restriction to the language of
fundamental physics might prevent us from expressing the latter, but presumably not the
former. And this will do just fine, for the case for the hint.
As I said in §2, I now feel that there are two hints, one from Lorentz Invariance and
one from Time Symmetry. Concerning the latter, I want to stress again that I think that
quantum theory introduces a new reason, not present in the classical regime, for thinking
that time symmetry requires retrocausality. A common objection to the retrocausal proposal
is a challenge I could paraphrase like this: ’What about time-symmetric classical physics?
Is that retrocausal?’ This presents retrocausalists like me with a dilemma. If we say ‘Yes’,
we are admitting that retrocausation is not novel or interesting, because it is common in
classical physics; if we say ‘No’, we have conceded that time symmetry alone does not
imply retrocausality, leaving it unclear what would do so.
Travis, I take you to be expressing the latter part of this challenge in remarks such as
this: ‘[S]uch theories as Maxwellian electrodynamics do not appear to support the specific
sort of zig-zag causality that would allow for a non-conspiratorial violation of Statistical
Independence. But then it is not clear to me what would’. In response, I want to outline
what I now think of as the best case for thinking that quantum theory is different.
The argument emerged from discussion in [33] of timelike versions of EPR-Bell exper-
iments, such as the one depicted in Figure 4. The ‘future’ end of the experiment involves a
polarising beam splitter, as used in many standard spacelike EPRB experiments. The ‘past’
end involves the same kind of device used in reverse, with a photon entering on one of two
channels. In this timelike one-photon experiment the input–output correlations depend on
the relation between the settings α and β of the two polarisers, just as in a regular spacelike
two-photon EPRB experiment.
Figure 4. A timelike EPR-Bell experiment.
Normally, the earlier experimenter (Alice) would be able to control the inputs as well
as the setting α, and would hence find it easy to signal to Bob, using photon polarisation to
carry the required information. The key new idea in [19] is that we restrict Alice’s control,
to make her situation analogous to Bob’s. We do this by putting the input photon under the
control of Demons, assumed to know the setting α. If the Demons are required to put the
input photon on one input channel or the other—i.e., they are not allowed a superposition
of the two—then their knowledge and options mirror those of nature at Bob’s end of the
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experiment, in two senses. Nature knows Bob’s setting β, and is required to produce a
photon on one output channel or other (at least when a measurement is made).
Let us call the no superpositions rule the Discreteness condition. Without it, the
Demons have complete control over the polarisation of the photon between the two
devices. Knowing α, they can choose weights for an input superposition to produce any
polarisation they want. With Discreteness, however, Alice retains very substantial control.
She controls the polarisation completely, up to an additive factor of 0 or π/2. (This factor
depends on which input channel the Demons choose.) Nevertheless, this degree of control
does not guarantee that Alice can signal to Bob. If the Demons choose the input channel at
random, and Alice does not know it when she chooses the setting, the control that results
from Discreteness does not permit Alice to signal.
So in this artificial situation—interesting because of the way it mirrors normal circum-
stances at the other end of the experiment—Discreteness introduces what looks by ordinary
interventionist lights to be a new element of forward causality. In effect, it gives Alice an
extra degree of control over the probabilities at Bob’s end of the experiment, compared
to the case in which the Demon is not restricted in this way (As [20,21] point out, this
is effectively the EPR reasoning, transferred to the timelike case). If this extra degree of
control is reflected in an underlying ontology, and the ontology is time-symmetric, it will
give Bob the same degree of control over the ontology at Alice’s end of the experiment.
This will amount to a violation of SI and to retrocausality, though not of a kind that would
support signalling to the past, for the same reason as in Alice’s case.
The full version of this argument comes with caveats I have not mentioned here (Some
of these caveats are removed in the generalisation by [20,21]). However I hope I have said
enough to explain why I take it on the one hand that violation of SI and retrocausality
are not an automatic consequence of time symmetry, but on the other hand that quantum
theory has features that may make them so. Moreover, the subtlety of the new kind of
forward causality revealed by this argument offers at least the beginnings of a response
to a different challenge: If there were retrocausality, why would it not be obvious and
everywhere? The response is that even its forward twin is hard to see (Note that in familiar
time-asymmetric models, in which the intermediate polarisation depends on Alice’s setting
but not Bob’s setting, the forward causality explains the correlations all by itself—no
retrocausality needed. This suggests that in time-symmetric models, with causal influence
in both directions, the forward and backward components could be even more subtle
because they share the explanatory work). In effect, we had to move ordinary forward
control out of the way first, and then focus on what remains.
Let me come back to the remark of yours I quoted above: ‘[T]heories as Maxwellian
electrodynamics do not appear to support the specific sort of zig-zag causality that would
allow for a non-conspiratorial violation of Statistical Independence. But then it is not clear
to me what would’. The answer suggested by the reasoning just described is that under
the constraint of time symmetry, non-conspiratorial violation of SI emerges from the same
place as the Bell correlations themselves. We saw that if we consider Bell correlations in
timelike settings, the EPR and Bell arguments reveal a distinctive kind of forward causality.
From that point, modulo the assumption mentioned about an ontological basis for this
causality, insisting on time-symmetry gets us to the violation of SI. (If we map this back to
the space-like cases, we then have the zig-zag causal structure we wanted).
Travis, I appreciate that you are less convinced than I am about both time symmetry
and CAT. As you say, you want to hold open the possibility that one or both fail, perhaps
independently. For me, both these options fall in the ‘I would not refuse to listen’ box.
However what matters for present purposes is not our differing credences about these
things. We seem to agree that—contrary to what many seem to think—a time-asymmetric
CAT does not have the status of a well-established piece of physical or metaphysical lore,
something that can simply be invoked without argument, in order to dismiss the hint. On
the contrary, work outside physics makes a significant case that the causal asymmetry
is not fundamental—which means that we have at least some reason to be suspicious of
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proposals within physics that assume otherwise, implicitly or explicitly. Similarly, work
inside physics gives us enough reason to take time symmetry seriously to imply that we
certainly can not take its failure for granted. So again, there is no sign here of something
sufficiently well-grounded to dismiss the hint.
The issue you raise of what goes into fundamental theory is very interesting, and in
my view quite difficult. It is hard to make sure that we have eradicated the conceptual
traces of our human perspective, especially our asymmetric temporal perspective. We
are predictive creatures, always acting for the future on the basis of limited knowledge of
the past. It is no surprise at all if we describe the world in terms appropriate for such a
viewpoint. However we need to keep an open mind to the possibility that the fundamental
level need not be described in these terms. (Again, I think we agree on the principle, even
if we have different credences about where it might lead us).
These lessons are as important for retrocausal approaches as for anyone else. For
one thing, there is a risk that in pursuit of time symmetry, retrocausal approaches find
themselves doubling-up ontology that would be better discarded. At the fundamental
level we should try to prune away elements that reflect our time-asymmetric viewpoint,
not balance them by adding elements reflecting a time-reversed viewpoint. In my view the
so-called Two State Vector approach may be guilty of this mistake [34].
With these ‘meta’ issues about fundamental theory still open, and the path to CFH
invisible to most in foundations of physics, let alone in physics more broadly, I think it is no
surprise that we retrocausalists do not yet have anything that could claim to be a ‘serious
candidate fundamental theory’, as you put it. I recommend [17,18] for recent surveys of
various approaches that have been proposed.
In the spirit of putting cards on the table, I will take this opportunity to record a
couple of preferences. First, I think that the de Broglie–Bohm theory (dBB) provides an
attractive and under-explored framework for this approach. It has the advantage of an
ontology both clear and sparse—I am thinking especially of the sense in which position
is the only fundamental property, other properties being contextual and relational. This
sparsity reduces the risk that we unwittingly build our own epistemic viewpoint into what
is intended to be fundamental ontology. Another virtue is that in dBB, probabilities emerge
much as in classical statistical mechanics, from a distribution over initial conditions. We do
not need fundamental time-asymmetric chances, or anything of that kind (I think there is
no deep difficulty in the fact that we normally consider a distribution over initial conditions;
final conditions would do the job just as well) . Finally, the dBB ontology offers an obvious
place to hide some subtle retrocausality—in fact, two places, namely the particle positions
and the pilot wave itself, if we give the latter an appropriate ontic status (There has already
been some work exploring retrocausal versions of dBB: see, e.g., [35,36]). See also [21] for
the sense in which orthodox dBB is time-asymmetric).
Secondly, and independently, I like proposals that seek to show how non-conspiratorial
SI-violating correlations might emerge from global constraints—e.g., recent work by Whar-
ton [37], Palmer [38], and Adlam [39,40]. The spirit of this approach is nicely captured by
Adlam’s remark that ‘God does not play dice, he plays Sudoku’ ([41]) (In Adlam’s version
the approach is also linked to an interest in fundamental ontology in what seems to me a
very interesting way).
Let me close by coming back to the idea that if we stick to the language of fundamental
physics, it will be impossible to draw my distinction between CPH and CFH. If I understand
you correctly, Travis, you think this may explain Bell’s apparent wish to lump the two
together. I am thinking of remarks such as this:
Indeed, in the context of such [fundamental] theories, my concern about the
retrocausalist proposal is not so much that backward causation is impossible or
unconscionable, but rather that the distinction between forward and backward
causation seems to melt away. In Maxwellian electrodynamics, for example, the
state of the particles and fields at one time determines the state of the particles
and fields at a later time. So did the former cause the latter, or vice versa? The
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laws of the theory certainly don’t answer that question; they just tell us that the
states at the two times are necessarily connected. (This, I take it, was Russell’s
point). So is Maxwellian electrodynamics a retrocausal theory? Maybe? I am
honestly not even sure what the question means.
In response, I want to distinguish two questions. First, does causal language appear
in the fundamental theory? I think we agree in saying ‘No’ to this, at least if we set aside
your lingering attachment to a fundamental CAT.
Second, does fundamental theory make distinctions which, when viewed from the
ordinary perspective of agents like us, map onto the distinctions we make in causal
language (including those involved in distinguishing between CPH and CFH, or between
forward and retrocausal models)? Here I say ‘Yes’. Why? Well, consider the corresponding
questions about colour. Are red and green categories in fundamental theory? Obviously
not. Do we expect fundamental theory to mark the difference between red things and green
things? In some sense, obviously, yes—that is what it is to take colour to supervene on
fundamental physics.
If there is a difference between the colour case and the causation case, it is that causal
concepts are much more deeply embedded in scientific practice. Some philosophers would
see in this an argument for thinking that causation itself needs to be fundamental, but set
that aside. Here we are considering the possibility that causation is not fundamental, or at
any rate not part of fundamental physics. My point is that this gives us no reason to reject
the supervenience of causation on physics. We should expect causal distinctions to depend
on lower-level differences, just as we expect for colour (This is not to deny that for both
colour and causation, there is also an anthropcentric element to the story about the relation
between the higher-level categories and underlying physics).
This means that I see no reason to think that fundamental physics will not continue to
provide the distinctions we need to make causal judgements, including those needed to
distinguish between CPH and CFH. However even if I turned out to be wrong, I think it
would leave the case for retaining SI no better off. If we throw out the vocabulary we need
to distinguish CPH and CFH, we also throw out the terminology we need to raise Bell’s
objections to rejecting SI. Even if we set aside such explicitly anthropocentric terms such
as ‘free will’ and ‘fatalism’, the remaining objection turns on the idea that science treats
measurement settings as exogenous variables. You are imagining that even this notion
‘should disappear at the more fundamental level’. However if we do not have that notion
in our vocabulary, we can not make Bell’s objection, and if we do have it, then we can
distinguish CPH from CFH (Even worse, we saw that the case for CFH (non-conspiratorial
violation of SI) runs very close to the EPR and Bell arguments themselves. If it really were
true that fundamental theory prevented us from making the former, I think it would follow
that we could not discern the latter. So there is a danger that by blocking the hint we would
deprive ourselves of the vocabulary to describe the problem itself).
7. Norsen (III)
In response to my skepticism about (so-called) Einstein Locality, you suggest that we
“can simply fall back on Lorentz Invariance”. However Lorentz Invariance is nearly as
ambiguous and problematic as the various notions of locality we have been discussing.
For example, theories with something like a “preferred frame” (an idea you mentioned, I
think, as something obviously incompatible with the spirit of fundamental relativity) can
be Lorentz Invariant and indeed can be argued to be fundamentally relativistic in a serious
sense [42,43]. I also personally have questions about what compatibility with relativity
could or should mean for theories (like virtually all extant, serious, and empirically viable
quantum theories) which postulate non-local beables such as the wave function.
However even leaving that issue aside, I remain confused by the same big-picture
point I raised initially. We know that it is possible to violate Bell’s Local Causality in a
Lorentz Invariant theory, in several distinct ways [35,42,44]. Thus if the goal is just to
reconcile Bell’s theorem with Lorentz Invariance, we can do this with (Lorentz Invariant)
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non-locality while still maintaining Statistical Independence. What is the motivation for
instead rejecting both Local Causality and Statistical Independence, by introducing retro-
causation? Of course, I cannot rule out the possibility that going down that road will yield
a theory that, despite in some sense rejecting more of Bell’s assumptions than is minimally
necessary, is more natural or believable overall as a way of reconciling Bell’s theorem
and the associated experiments with fundamental relativity. But, as I have said, I would
personally want to be more convinced that the idea of retro-causality was even coherent, in
the context of a candidate fundamental theory without “measurement problem” issues,
before investing my own time and energy on such a project.
On that issue of coherence, I must admit that I remain somewhat unsure about how to
answer the question—“What about time-symmetric classical physics? Is that retrocausal?”—
that you explained poses a dilemma for the retrocausalist. I think your answer must be
no, because otherwise I would not understand why you would bother with the somewhat
complicated setup and associated argument purporting to establish “that quantum theory
is different”—different, I gather you mean, from straightforwardly time-symmetric theories
(such as classical mechanics) in supposedly possessing the somewhat subtle and previously-
unrecognised sort of causal (including specifically retro-causal) influences that you discuss.
Unfortunately, though, I find this argument totally unconvincing. It is based com-
pletely on the orthodox/textbook version of quantum mechanics including, in particular,
the collapse postulate whose presence is the very core of the measurement problem. The
crucial assumption you call Discreteness is just a kind of time-symmetrised collapse postu-
late, and, as you acknowledge in the more detailed discussion of [19], the argument fails
to work for the two extant candidate quantum theories with time-symmetric dynamics,
namely the de Broglie–Bohm (dBB) and Everett theories (I will also note that the alter-
native notion of time-symmetry developed, for example, in [20], as a generalisation of
your argument, is in my opinion revealed to be inappropriate/irrelevant by the fact that
manifestly time-symmetric theories such as dBB and Everett do not respect it). I would
summarise the situation by saying that the argument fails to work precisely because these
theories eliminate the need for a collapse postulate, i.e., because they do not suffer from
the measurement problem.
Yes, as you point out there, this does not mean that such theories necessarily exclude
retro-causality. Indeed, as I indicated before, the fundamentally time-symmetric character
of the dynamical laws in those theories makes me perfectly open to admitting that they
have retro-causality to exactly the same degree or extent, whatever that is exactly, that
they have regular forward-causality. But I gather, from the fact that, if I am understanding
correctly, you suggest somehow changing or supplementing dBB—“to hide some subtle
retrocausality”—that you do not see any retro-causality, of the sort you want and need,
in that theory’s standard extant formaultion. However I do not understand that proposal
at all. In [19] you suggest that, in order to deny that dBB is retro-causal in the needed
sense, “it needs to be assumed that neither the wave function nor the initial positions of the
particles are affected by later measurement choices”. However both elements of the dBB
ontology, the wave function and the particle positions, just obey deterministic evolution
equations. Aside from “external fields”, which would obviously not be included when the
theory is applied to the world as a whole, there is simply no room for outside influences,
by “measurement choices” or anything else.
To me, that is, it appears that the idea that dBB is somehow a promising candidate
for retro-causality of the sort you want and need, arises only from a failure to appreciate
that dBB can and should be thought of as a candidate fundamental theory, which does not
need (and indeed does not even allow) special ad hoc exceptions to the basic dynamical
postulates, associated with measurement or anything else. To me it instead seems clear that
the only sort of retro-causality one could plausibly attribute to the de Broglie–Bohm theory
is just exactly the sort that one could, with equal plausibility, attribute to the Everettian
quantum theory, Maxwellian electrodynamics, or classical particle mechanics. However,
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again, and as far as I can tell, this is a sort of retro-causation that you acknowledge is not
what you need, so you do not even call it retro-causality.
To summarise that point, it seems to me that in order to find the sort of thing you
are looking for, you retrocausalists need to set aside the best extant candidate funda-
mental time-symmetric quantum theories (dBB and Everett) and instead work with a
time-symmetrised version of a theory that suffers from “measurement problem” issues (or,
as in [20], implausibly re-define the meaning of “time-symmetric”). This just reinforces my
previously-expressed sense that the very concept of retro-causation, of the sort you want
and need, is a kind of mirage. It appears to be meaningful only when you put intervention-
ist causality in by hand, by backing away from the fundamental level of description and
instead treating certain things as “exogenous”, i.e., outside of the quantum system under
study and amenable to some kind of agent control. Doing this is, admittedly, part of the
essential character of orthodox quantum theory. But that does not make it right.
You suggest that although causal language will likely not appear, as such, at the
fundamental level, a candidate fundamental theory should probably still “make distinc-
tions which, when viewed from the ordinary perspective of agents like us, map onto the
distinctions we make in causal language”. I completely agree. Causality should supervene
on fundamental physics even if it does not appear there explicitly labelled as such. And
as I have said I am completely open to the possibility that, for example, in the context
of a candidate deterministic time-symmetric fundamental theory like dBB, there might
well be some legitimate grounds for speaking in terms of retro-causal influences. I do not
exactly see what those grounds might be, but I am happy to leave the door open. But at
least as long as the fundamental physics remains deterministic, it seems to me that any
correlations of the sort needed to violate Statistical Independence—even ones that we end
up agreeing make sense to describe, “when viewed from the ordinary perspective of agents
like us” who are part of the world described by the theory, in terms of retro-causality and
the CFH—will imply correlated correlations, so to speak, in the physical state of the world
at some much earlier time.
Let me try to explain more clearly what I am trying to get at here. There is some equip-
ment in the lab that is arranged, in a certain way, to produce a sequence of particle pairs
whose state we describe with the variable λ. And the experimenters set up some pieces of
measuring equipment, including, say, some random number generators, which perform,
on the incoming particle pairs, measurements of the particles’ spins along directions a and
b. We know, I take it, that λ is causally influenced by (even if not completely determined
by) the state of the lab equipment: If something is not plugged in, no particle pairs will
emerge at all; if some optical element is mis-aligned, the pairs may emerge in (what QM
would describe as) a triplet state instead of the intended singlet state, etc. Similarly, the
precise sequence of settings, a and b, is in fact determined by various details of the setup.
To make things really concrete, let us suppose that the particle source produces pairs
with states coming in a certain order, starting from the moment the equipment was most
recently powered up. And suppose that morning there was a windstorm in town, which
resulted in a tree falling on a power line, briefly interrupting the supply of electricity to the
lab, and thus causing the particle source to reboot and reinitiate its sequence of emitted
pairs at that particular moment. Similarly, suppose that the seed for the pseudo-random
number generating algorithm was chosen, on this occasion, by the number of blueberries
in the lab assistant’s pancake at the diner earlier that morning.
Now, in a fully deterministic theory like dBB, there does not seem to me to be any
basis for claiming, nor does there appear to be any room for adding, causal influences from
the settings, a and b, onto λ. The settings are just determined by various things in their
past, as are the pair states. Thus to posit a Statistical-Independence-violating correlation
between these is to posit a very special, “just so” type of correlation between the precise
physical details of the morning windstorm which resulted in that particular tree being
blown down at that particular moment, and the precise physical details of the factors
determining the subtle movements of the diner chef’s hand which resulted in, say, 11,
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rather than 10 or 12, blueberries ending up in that one particular pancake. This is the sort
of correlation needed to violate Statistical Independence with the CPH, and I think we
agree that it seems unacceptably conspiratorial.
The new point I want to make here is that I do not see, exactly, how violating Statistical
Independence instead with the CFH leads to a less conspiratorial picture. Suppose I keep
an open mind and allow for the possibility that some hypothetical future theory might
include, in some meaningful and compelling way, retro-causal influences from the settings
a and b onto the pair states λ. My point here is that, presumably, that theory will also have
to acknowledge the causal connection (and hence tight correlation) between the precise
sequence of settings a and b and whatever complicated factors determined how many
blueberries ended up in the lab assistant’s pancakes. It will also, presumably, have to
acknowledge the causal influence of the morning windstorm on λ. I do not know quite
how the distinct causal influences on λ—one (backwards in time) from a and b, and one
(forward in time) from the morning windstorm—would be reconciled in such a theory.
Maybe the theory would say that a and b are, alone, sufficient to determine λ, and would
thus be forced into saying that λ, instead of being influenced by the morning windstorm,
retro-causally determines the relevant details of that morning windstorm. Or maybe
there really would be two oppositely-direct causal influences on λ, neither of which alone
would be sufficient to determine lambda, but which, together, are. In this scenario as well,
we would (presumably) still have to end up with a very tight correlation between the
morning windstorm and the settings, and therefore also between the morning windstorm
and blueberries.
This is precisely the sort of correlation, between seemingly-random details of the
states of seemingly-unrelated phenomena in the past, which we regard as unacceptably
conspiratorial in the context of the CPH. Why should such correlations be considered any
less conspiratorial in the context of the CFH? For this reason, to me, the distinction between
violating Statistical Independence with the CPH, and violating it with the CFH, becomes
blurry at best when we zoom out, include more of the world in our system, and refrain
from treating various elements in a special way, as “exogenous interventions”.
You claimed, at the end of your most recent contribution that to whatever extent we
lose the ability to make the CPH/CFH distinction, we will also lose, to that same extent,
the ability to argue for the reasonableness of Statistical Independence (or even to rehearse
the EPR argument and Bell’s theorem) in the first place. I do not understand this. As
discussed in the exchange with Shimony, Clauser, and Horne that Bell referenced in his
letter to you, the main case for Statistical Independence is a practical and empirical one.
In particular, Statistical Independence is assumed in virtually every scientific experiment.
Think, for example, of a randomised controlled drug trial whose standard interpretation
requires assuming that the (say) coin flips, determining which patients got the drug and
which the placebo, were uncorrelated with the previous health of the patients: If all of the
patients who got the real drug survive and all the patients who got the placebo die, we
would ordinarily infer that the drug works well to prevent death. However, of course, it is
possible that the drug has no positive effect at all; instead, the coin came up tails for, and
hence the placebo was given to, all and only those patients who had some other health
condition, totally unrelated to that targeted by the drug, and were destined to die of that.
As Shimony, Horne, and Clauser put it, in a passage you quoted earlier but which bears
repeating here, denying Statistical Independence:
...will essentially dismiss all results of scientific experimentation. Unless we
proceed under the assumption that hidden conspiracies of this sort do not occur,
we have abandoned in advance the whole enterprise of discovering the laws of
nature by experimentation. [8]
Science, that is, relies on the Statistical Independence assumption, and science unques-
tionably works.
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This practical case for Statistical Independence does not appear to me to rely on
any interventionist perspective on the applicability of causal terminology to fundamental
theories. Indeed, it is easy enough to understand what Statistical Independence means
in the context of such theories. For the randomised drug trial, it means that the specific
facts, in the distant past, which determine the precise sequence of coin flips (used to assign
placebo or drug to each patient) should not be conspiratorially correlated with the specific
facts which determine whether those individual patients will or will not die of some
unrelated malady. Similarly, in the EPR-Bell case, Statistical Independence means that
the specific facts which determine the sequence of measurement settings a and b (e.g., the
blueberries) should not be conspiratorially correlated with the specific facts which influence
the sequence of particle pair states λ (e.g., the windstorm).
Of course, Huw, you will want to say I am begging the question here by inserting the
word “conspiratorially”. Your whole point is that, if the settings retro-causally influence
the pair states, the needed correlations between (on the one hand) a and b and (on the other
hand) λ would not need to be conspiratorial at all.
By way of concluding, let me try to summarise the several reasons I have explored,
throughout this dialogue, for being sceptical of this project.
First, I am sceptical that, at the level of a fundamental candidate theory (i.e., without
“interventions” and “exogenous” variables) the idea of retro-causation, of the rather special
sort you want and need, even makes sense. (When I look at extant candidate fundamental
theories, at least the time-symmetric deterministic ones we have available, the idea of as-
signing specific temporally-oriented causal arrows to specific sub-processes seems arbitrary
and groundless. At the fundamental level, the theories just assert necessary connections
between states at different times).
Second, I am sceptical of the claim that, if you did somehow produce a candidate
fundamental theory that somehow made your desired sort of violation of SI compelling, the
theory would respect some meaningful “Einstein Locality” or Lorentz Invariance condition.
(It seems more likely to me that, without the terminological restraints introduced by
interventionism, your “indirect” zig-zag causality would end up being ubiquitous and the
theory would end up being wantonly non-local and blatantly incompatible with relativity).
The new, third, grounds for scepticism that I have been trying to raise here has to
do with the fact that, even in a (deterministic) candidate fundamental theory in which it
somehow made sense to speak of the settings a and b retro-causally influencing the pair
states λ, something still determines the settings, and some other factors, besides a and
b, will presumably still have to have some influence on λ. And these influences, traced
further backwards in time, will imply some very particular and special correlations, in the
earlier states, which, at least from this abstract perspective, do not seem different from—
and so do not seem any less conspiratorial than—the correlations posited by the CPH.
A concrete candidate theory could, in principle, cleanly refute any or all of the grounds
for scepticism I have expressed here. However, so far I have never seen a candidate retro-
causal theory with the appropriate “pretension to physical precision”. I have instead only
seen various sorts of toy models that focus on some narrow system, postulate “interven-
tions” by treating certain variables as “exogenous”, and (hence) suffer from a kind of
“measurement problem”. I have not, that is, seen anything that refutes my scepticism, so I
remain unconvinced that the retro-causal program generally, and the distinction between
the CPH and CFH in particular, can survive the translation to a more serious, candidate
fundamental theory.
Was it similar reasoning that led Bell, in the letter reproduced in Figure 1, to dis-
miss your retro-causal project? I am not sure. If anything, it seems more likely to me
that he just did not appreciate that you wanted to violate Statistical Independence in a
non-standard and purportedly non-conspiratorial way. But I think it is at least possible
that he, as a consistent champion of the need for fundamental theories which avoid the
measurement problem, recognised that, from this fundamental point of view, the standard
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and non-standard ways of violating SI—that is, the CPH and CFH—are very difficult to
even distinguish.
That, at any rate, is where I, having been profoundly influenced by Bell, end up. At
least for the time being.
8. Price (IV)
Travis, it is a little frustrating to close at this point, when your latest comments raise
several points for further discussion. However, wrap up we must, so I will confine these
closing comments to just one issue, that of ‘conspiracy’. Before that, I want to say a very
warm thanks to you for taking this on. As you know, the idea for this dialogue originated
in an exchange of Facebook comments, after I shared my letter from Bell there. Some
fascinating discussion takes place on Facebook these days, but it has been a pleasure,
as well as an education, to do this the old, slow way (‘Too swiftly now the Hours take
flight!/What’s read at morn is dead at night’, as Austin Dobson—a man well ahead of his
time!—noted already in the 1880s [45] [233]).
Now to conspiracies. Helpfully, you suggest an answer to your own objection:
[Y]ou will want to say I am begging the question here by inserting the word
“conspiratorially”. Your whole point is that, if the settings retro-causally influence
the pair states, the needed correlations between (on the one hand) a and b and
(on the other hand) λ would not need to be conspiratorial at all.
That would do, but I want to say a bit more. For one thing, I want to make sure it is
clear why I take CFH to be much less vulnerable to the conspiracies charge in the first place.
I introduced the term ‘conspiracy’ into our discussion in §2. It occurs there in the
quote from Shimony, Clauser, and Horne [8] that you quote again. But I did not use the
term myself in distinguishing CPH and CFH. For me, the crucial difference was simply that
unlike CPH, CFH treats measurement settings in the normal way, as exogenous variables.
I noted that this explains how CFH escapes the objection that these authors and many
since have raised for CPH, that it is incompatible with ‘the whole enterprise of discovering
the laws of nature by experimentation’. However, a few paragraphs later I added that I
had not dealt with the suggestion that CFH also requires something ‘conspiratorial’. Let
me now come back to that, and explain why it is a very different issue from the one that
confronts CPH.
In your account of the conspiracies objection, you note that physicists (notoriously
playful folk) can easily put measurement settings under the control of such things as the
number of blueberries in a pancake. And you point out—rightly, if you are talking about
CPH—that this means that any theory trying to break Statistical Independence is going
to have to concern itself with blueberries. Just look at the two (fortuitously) blue arrows
in Figure 2. If there are blueberries on the causal chains that those arrows represent, the
common cause needs to control the blueberries, along with everything else in the chain.
Quite an ask.
However now look at Figure 3, depicting CFH. Here, the guts of the retrocausal
proposal is some sort of lawlike constraint, correlating the measurement setting a with
properties λ of the lefthand particle along the first black arrow. (The direction of the arrow
just reflects the fact that a is an exogenous variable, on which interventions are possible.)
Once we have these guts, the story about the blueberries follows for free. Blueberries are
simply one among the endless ways that ingenious experimenters can devise to control
the value of an exogenous variable (i.e., to provide the green arrow in Figure 3). We do
not need anything novel or conspiratorial to control them. By way of comparison, imagine
someone puzzled about how the buttons on a remote handset control a television. There is
no additional mystery about how blueberries, too (and everything in the past on which
they themselves depend), can control the television, if we hook them up to the handset
(To take this analogy a little further, we could imagine blueberries being used as a source
of (effectively) random experimental interventions, in a project to test the hypothesis that
settings of the handset have a causal influence on the television. In that project it would be
Entropy 2021, 23, 251 26 of 29
absurd, of course, to assume statistical independence between the handset settings and the
state of the television—what we would be looking for would be, precisely, violations of such
independence. This trivial example shows that science does not assume such Statistical
Independence everywhere, and that it is indeed begging the question against CFH to
assume it in the form of the principle we have been calling Statistical Independence).
So CFH is far less vulnerable to the charge of conspiracy than CPH. If there is some-
thing seemingly conspiratorial in CFH, it is the fact that the particles ‘already know’ the
measurement settings, in some sense, before they arrive at the measurement devices.
This certainly looks strange to ordinary intuitions, and words such as ‘conspiratorial’, or
‘teleological’, do something to capture this strangeness.
If someone objects to CFH on this basis I am inclined to accuse them of a temporal
double standard—in other words, as I used the term in [10], applying different principles
in one direction of time to the other, without offering any justification for the difference.
This kind of ‘conspiratorial’ behaviour is exceedingly common in the direction from future
to past, thanks to the thermodynamic asymmetry. Think of all the time-reversed videos
you have ever seen of omelettes transforming themselves into unbroken eggs, and similar
things. Many writers take that kind of behaviour to be explained by a lawlike constraint in
the past, the so-called Past Hypothesis.
I am not suggesting that CFH involves a time-reversed version of the familiar thermo-
dynamic asymmetry. However, if anyone objects to this remaining sense in which CFH
looks conspiratorial, I will ask them whether they would still object to the time-reversed
version of the same theory, in which a particle and a measuring device are correlated in
virtue of a lawlike constraint on an interaction in their common past. If not, I will accuse
them of a temporal double standard. That is close to the charge of begging the question,
but a bit more specific in a useful way (I discuss these issues at length in [10] [Ch. 5]).
Obviously there is more to say here. For one thing, I have not said anything about
your concern that CFH requires λ to be controlled from two directions. Indeed, reading
through the whole thing again, it feels like we are just warming up. But for the moment,
thanks again, Travis—and I hope this will not be our last opportunity to discuss these
questions. Perhaps this dialogue will encourage others to weigh in on one side or other,
and take up open issues.
9. Norsen (IV)
I share the sense that we are only now getting warmed up. However I think, rather
than be frustrated to wrap up just when it feels like we are finally getting to the heart of
the issues, we should appreciate the progress that getting to this point represents. And
of course the end of this particular dialogue is not the end of dialogue as such. Our
illuminating and highly enjoyable discussion here can hopefully generate and influence
further constructive discussions in the future (and, not to rudely ignore the possibility of
retro-causation, perhaps also in the past).
By way of wrapping up, I will just touch briefly on two points, making a special
effort not to unfairly lob any new rhetorical grenades. In particular, I want to flag, for
the purposes of future discussion, a point where I think we may have a substantive and
unresolved disagreement. And then I will attempt to clarify my (admittedly potentially
misleading) use of the word “conspiracy” in my previous contribution.
So, first, the flag. You said that my argument “that any theory trying to break Statistical
Independence is going to have to concern itself with blueberries” would apply “if you are
talking about CPH”. I think you meant to imply that this argument does not apply in the
context of CFH. But the whole point of my admittedly silly parable involving blueberries
and windstorms, is precisely that it should still apply, either way.
You wrote that, for you, “the crucial difference [between CPH and CFH] was simply
that unlike CPH, CFH treats measurement settings in the normal way, as exogenous vari-
ables”. But perhaps the fundamental theme running through everything I have written here
is that everything we might want to say about the EPR-Bell scenario needs be compatible
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with the perspective of a candidate fundamental theory which is free of “measurement
problem” issues and in which, in particular, there are no exogenous variables.
Therefore, if the reason you think that the CFH is not “going to have to concern itself
with blueberries” is that the CFH by definition treats measurement settings as exogenous
(and is hence freed from the responsibility of considering the factors that, in a real-world
implementation of this setup, would in fact influence/determine the settings), then I would
regard that as a fatal flaw in the CFH program.
As always, though, I suspect there may be some mutual misunderstanding that makes
our differences appear greater than they really are. In particular, your reference back to
the (indeed, fortuitously) blue arrows in Figure 2 gives me pause. You say: “If there are
blueberries on the causal chains that those arrows represent, the common cause needs to
control the blueberries, along with everything else in the chain. Quite an ask!”
But I believe the way you are thinking of Statistical Indepedence being violated here,
in the context of the CPH, is not what I had in mind. It is of course true that Statistical
Independence could easily be violated if, instead of the particle pair source spitting out pairs
in a pre-defined order determined by the precise moment and location of the windstorm,
the pair source instead spits out a sequence of particles in states that are, say, determined
by the output of the very same random number generator (seeded by the blueberry count)
that is also determining the settings. This sort of arrangement would seem to be the sort of
thing you had in mind (in which the blueberries, the pair states λ, and the settings a and
b are all on the same future-directed causal chain. But there would be nothing remotely
conspiratorial about the failure of Statistical Independence in this kind of case. We would
just blame the failure on an exceedingly stupid experimental design by the experimenters.
What I had in mind—what I thought we agreed would count as unacceptably
conspiratorial—is instead the possibility that Statistical Independence could be violated
(still leaving aside the possibility of retro-causation, i.e., working still in the framework
of the CPH) with a more sensible experimental design, in which the causal chain leading
up to the pair states λ and the chain leading up to the settings a and b, have no apparent
connection. That was the point of the parable, with the windstorm affecting the one thing
and the (causally disconnected) blueberries affecting the other. To me, the interesting
question is whether Statistical Independence might still be violated in this kind of case.
And of course it might be. But its being violated (with the non-stupid experimental
design) would require certain subtle details in the kitchen of the diner to be correlated,
just so, with certain subtle details of the weather pattern across town. The usual attitude,
though, is that there is no reason those details should be correlated. So positing that they
are—that is, rejecting Statistical Independence—amounts to asserting something that
has a highly implausible, “conspiratorial” feel to it.
So much for the flag. Now to the clarification.
The point I was making previously is that, by considering the CFH (in which the
settings a and b retro-causally influence the pair states λ), we in no way remove the
correlation (between those subtle details in the diner and other subtle details in the weather
pattern across town) that we would be committed to with the CPH. I think in the end you
agreed with this; at least, that is how I understand your comment that “the story about
the blueberries follows for free” (But you see, I am confused, because you also previously
insisted that the CFH requires taking the settings as exogenous). Assuming this is correct,
though, I think you then just want to object to my characterisation of the correlations as
“conspiratorial”. They would be (as I thought we agreed) in the CPH, because in that context
there is no reason for them. However, I think you want to say, these same correlations are
not at all “conspiratorial” in the CFH because the causal connection between the future
end of the one chain (the settings) and the future end of the other chain (the pair states)
connects the two otherwise-unconnected chains, and thus provides a perfectly good reason
for the subtle details (on the past ends of the two, now-connected, chains) to be correlated.
Indeed, as I think you want to say, once we allow retro-causation, those correlations are no
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weirder, no more conspiratorial, than the future correlations which we already allow must
exist between subtle details of things which have interacted in the past.
If you accept this as a fair summary of your view, Huw, I am happy to just concede
all of it. I should not have continued to use the inflammatory word “conspiratorial” to
describe the correlations (between subtle details of things like blueberries and windstorms
in the past) that both CPH and CFH are, I think, committed to, when discussing those
correlations from the point of view of the CFH. The correlations are the same, whether we
adopt the CPH or the CFH, but their conspiratorial-ness is not the same.
However my intention was not to beg the question. Partly I developed the parable
and pushed this point just because I think it is important to acknowledge that violating
Statistical Independence implies these sorts of correlations, regardless of how exactly one
does it. (Treating measurement settings as exogenous variables tends to obscure this fact).
In addition, just because these sorts of correlations (in so far as they arise via the CFH)
should not be described (and subsequently dismissed) as “conspiratorial”, does not mean
they are beyond reproach. For example, as I think you hinted at, their existence raises ques-
tions about how to reconcile the posited retro-causation with the statistical/thermodynamic
arrow of time. And I have to admit that I feel a vague additional sense of unease about
such correlations, stretching, as they would clearly have to, all the way back to the big
bang. I have a hard time putting my finger on the reason for this queasiness. Of course,
one possibility is that, try as I might, I can not quite get myself to take retro-causation fully
seriously, so, in my gut, I respond just as I would to the conspiratorial character that those
same correlations would have in a theory without retro-causation.
I do think there is more to it than that, however, and what I meant to gesture toward
before was the thought that maybe this could explain what Bell wrote in his letter to
you. If “fatalism” is the uncomfortable idea that our apparent freedom (or even just
apparent randomness) is illusory—that what we choose to (or just happen to) do has, in
fact, been pre-written in a script going all the way back to the big bang—then is there
not a kind of time-reversed fatalism inherent in your CFH? For me at least, and perhaps
for Bell, the idea that my apparently free choices (for example, about how to seed the
random number generator that controls the settings in a Bell experiment) end up causing
incomprehensibly subtle correlations in the early universe, is no less uncomfortable than
the idea that incomprehensibly subtle correlations in the early universe are the true causes
of my apparently free choices.
However, is there more to this discomfort than a lingering bias against retro-causation?
Answering that will, I think, require further reflection, discussion, and debate. I look
forward to that, and I thank you again for inviting me to participate in this.
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